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Abstract
This note provides evidence on how immigration costs affect school
performance of immigrant children exploiting the information provided
by the CDI; a standardized exam for all students enrolled in the last
year of Primary education in the Madrid region. For a given socio-
economic background and parent characteristics, school performance of
immigrant children improves with parental immigration costs.
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1 Introduction
In this note, we provide evidence on the relationship between immigration
costs and immigrant children’s educational achievement. In general, few stud-
ies have explored the determinants of school achievement of immigrant chil-
dren. Those studies focus on the impact of children’s characteristics, such as
age at migration (Corak, 2011), language proficiency (Dustmann, Machin and
Scho¨nberg, 2010; Dustmann and Glitz, 2011) or whether one or both parents
are immigrants (Ohinata and van Ours, 2012).
However, the effect of immigration costs as a determinant of school per-
formance has been overlooked. Clearly, immigration costs affect immigration
decisions and selection. Moreover, when people migrate as a family the fu-
ture opportunities of immigrant children are likely to weigh in the migration
decision. As argued by Albornoz, Cabrales and Hauk (2017), the overall ben-
efits from migration will then depend on parental motivation and aspirations.
One aspect of immigrant selection is therefore parental involvement, which
establishes a link between immigration cost and the school performance of im-
migrant children. When parental selection improves in immigration costs, the
school performance of immigrant children should increase in parental immi-
gration cost. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper establishing
this empirical association.
Our results are based on a standardized evaluation of the universe of stu-
dents (native and migrants) at the region of Madrid (Spain). The case of
Madrid is interesting because of the high proportion of immigrant population
(17% in 2010), the variety of origins (with the 10 top immigration origins ex-
plaining 70% of total immigration) and the fact that immigration is a relatively
new phenomenon (immigrants comprised only a 0.5% of total population in
1981).1 We find that immigrant children perform better if their parents faced
higher emigration costs. This result is robust to controls for family and country
of origin characteristics. Therefore, the positive association between immigra-
tion costs and immigrant children’s school performance cannot be explained
by selection of migrants in skills or education levels or the quality of education
in the origin country.
1Information provided by the Observatorio Permanente de la Inmigracio´n and Spanish
Statistical Office.
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2 Empirical Hypothesis and Data
Albornoz, Cabrales and Hauk (2017) propose a theoretical model linking immi-
gration and the school system. In this model, student outcomes are determined
endogenously as a result of the interplay between different families (immigrants
and natives) and the school system. The effect of immigration on schooling de-
pends on parents’ characteristics, such as wages and skills, but also on parental
motivation, which refers to parents’ concerns about their child’s educational
achievement and their perceived value / importance of their involvement for
their child’s success. This model identifies conditions under which, for any skill
level, immigrants are positively selected in parental motivation. When highly
motivated parents enjoy relatively higher benefits from emigrating, selection
in parental motivation improves with higher emigration costs. This implies
our empirical hypothesis: for a given host country, immigrant children who
perform better are those whose parents faced higher immigration costs.
We test this hypothesis exploiting the information provided by the Prueba
de Conocimientos y Destrezas Indispensables (CDI), a standardized exam
taken at the last year of primary education in all primary schools in the Madrid
region. The exam consists of two sections of 45 minutes each, Language and
Maths, and it is conducted in Spanish for all students, independently of the
school type. The CDI has the advantage of providing precise information
about immigrant students, which stems from a questionnaire on student’s in-
dividual and family characteristics, filled out by each student before taking
the exam. This allows us to identify the country of origin of the student and
their parents, and the student’s arrival age to Spain.
We focus on students who took the CDI in 2010. We associate the immi-
grant group of a student by the father’s country of origin (focusing on mothers
does not affect the results), independently of where the student was born.
Our measure of performance is given by the student’s total score in the CDI,
standardized to the yearly mean.
Table 1 reports the average total score and the average Maths and Lan-
guage scores of the CDI exam in 2010 for the ten largest migratory groups in
Madrid. While immigrants perform on average worse than Spanish students,
the performance of immigrant students varies considerably across origins. Stu-
dents whose fathers are migrants from Ecuador, Bolivia, Dominican Republic
or Morocco are outperformed, on average, by those students whose fathers are
Romanian, Polish or Russian.
We use the sample of immigrant students from the CDI to test whether
variations in performance across different immigration groups are grounded
in differences in immigration costs across immigrant’s source countries. For
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Table 1: Mean scores in CDI test for principal migratory groups.
Country of birth Total Sample
of the father Score Language Mathematics Size
Ecuador 20.00 12.34 7.65 2,654
(8.99) (4.85) (5.18)
Morocco 18.66 11.09 7.51 1,215
(10.15) (5.81) (5.37)
Romania 22.60 13.34 9.23 1,195
(9.35) (4.90) (5.47)
Colombia 21.60 13.00 8.68 912
(8.99) (4.82) (5.27)
Peru 23.10 13.71 9.41 866
(8.90) (4.47) (5.43)
Dominican Republic 16.47 10.36 6.12 563
(9.58) (5.69) (4.98)
Bolivia 20.53 12.59 7.94 520
(9.15) (4.94) (5.30)
China 20.72 9.57 11.08 387
(10.71) (6.71) (5.27)
Poland 25.63 14.98 10.69 201
(8.51) (3.99) (5.47)
Russia 27.54 15.57 12.43 22
(9.66) (4.17) (6.02)
Average for immigrants 21.88 12.97 8.89 11,765
(9.63) (5.16) (5.54)
Average for all students 25.88 14.91 10.95 52,246
(8.94) (4.38) (5.46)
Note: Standard deviations in parenthesis.
4
children i, in migratory group k and school s, we estimate the following model
by OLS:
Scoreiks = ImmigrationCosts
′
kα + x
′
iβ + z
′
kδ + γs + µiks. (1)
Immigration Costs is a vector of variables that proxy for the difficulty of mi-
grating from origin country k to Madrid. This vector contains an indicator
variable of whether country k has Spanish as the official language, Common
Languagek; the log of bilateral distance between k and Madrid, ln(Distance)k
2;
and the share of the migratory group k over total immigration, Proportion of
Migrantsk, computed from the CDI. The implicit assumption is that immigra-
tion costs increase with distance and decrease with the share of the migratory
group and when countries share a common language. We also consider an al-
ternative measure of migratory fixed costs developed by Grogger and Hanson
(2011), MigratoryCostsHGk, which aims to capture both direct monetary
costs of migration, and the monetary value of psychological costs and source
specific immigration policies imposed by Spain.
The vector x′i includes variables to control for socioeconomic background
of students, which are potential determinants of student performance, and are
constructed from the CDI. Following Anghel and Cabrales (2014) these con-
trols include the child’s arrival age to Spain (Arrival Age i), variables capturing
the mother’s education level, the highest parental occupation, the family com-
position, the age and gender of the student, and the age when child started
formal education. The vector z′i controls for characteristics of the country of
origin which are not directly associated with the cost of migration to Spain,
but which might affect the performance of students.
Our main results control by the logarithm of the GDP per capita of the
country of origin in 2010, ln(GDPpc)k. We use the logarithm of the GDP
per capita since this variable is available for most countries in our sample and
is correlated with other measures of performance coming from standardize
international assessments, such as PISA (correlation=0.77), PIRLS (correla-
tion=0.42) and TIMSS (correlation=0.46).3 In the Appendix, we control in-
stead for the quality of the school system at origin using country performance
in these international standardized assessments. Since international exams are
not implemented in every country, our sample is significantly reduced in these
specifications. Although this reduces the power of our estimation, our results
2Bilateral distances are calculated as the distance between the biggest city in the country
of origin and Madrid, weighted for the share of the city in the overall country population.
This variable is obtained from CEPII website: http://www.cepii.fr/.
3GDP per capita was obtained from the World Development Indicators database.
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Table 2: Dependent Variable: Standardized Aggregate Score in the CDI exam.
(1) (2) (3)
CommonLanguagek -0.158*** -0.320***
(0.037) (0.041)
ln(Distance)k 0.066*** 0.132***
(0.020) (0.019)
Immigrant Sharek -0.806*** -0.294**
(0.136) (0.138)
MigratoryCostsHGk 0.004***
(0.001)
Socioeconomic controls (xi) No Yes Yes
Characteristics of origin (zi) No Yes Yes
School FE (γs) Yes Yes Yes
Observations 11,755 10,037 8,468
R-squared 0.273 0.414 0.420
Robust standard errors clustered by school and country or origin of the
father in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
are robust to these controls.
Finally, γs captures school fixed effects. Since scores may be associated
with specific characteristics of the migratory group and the schools in which
they may concentrate, we cluster errors to allow within source country and
within school correlation.
3 Results
Table 2 reports our main results. In column (1), we estimate performance
against our migration costs variables, without additional controls. The coef-
ficient associated with CommonLanguagek is both negative and significant.
Coming from a Spanish speaking country has a negative effect on student
performance. The coefficient associated to ln(Distance)k is positive and sig-
nificant. Arguably, a larger distance from Madrid is likely to involve higher
migration costs, which could give place to a selection of more motivated par-
ents. Finally, the coefficient associated to the variable Proportion of Migrantsk,
is negative and significant, supporting the hypothesis that a more important
network of migrants reduces schooling outcomes, as migration costs decrease.
In column (2) we include additional determinants of student performance.4
A main concern is that the variables considered as proxies of immigration costs
4The coefficients for these additional controls are not reported, but are available upon
request.
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may be correlated with other characteristics of the country of origin which
might affect performance. We control for the logarithm of GDP in 2010 of
the source country. While this variable is positive and significant, the effect of
our immigration costs variables remain qualitatively unchanged. We also add
variables to control for socioeconomic and cultural status of students and their
families. These variables have the expected signs, consistently with Anghel and
Cabrales (2014). Reassuringly, adding these controls does not affect the signs
and significance of our variables of interest.
Results in column (2) are quantitatively relevant. Sharing the official lan-
guage reduces the score of the students in 0.32 standard deviations, a marginal
effect of 11%. Taking two countries as Ecuador and Poland this variable ex-
plains, ceteris paribus, half of the difference in the average CDI score between
these countries. An increase of 1% in distance, increases the score in the CDI
exam in 0.0013 standard deviations. In the case of two countries as Poland and
Morocco (with distances to Madrid of 2,293 and 762 kilometers, respectively),
this is equivalent 1.3 points, explaining 19% of the difference in the average
score. For the importance of the migrant network, an increase in 1 percentage
point in the share of migrants negatively affects the aggregate score in 0.003
standard deviations. In the case of Ecuador and Romania (with a propor-
tion of migrants of 22.7% and 10.3%, respectively), this explains 13% of the
difference in average scores existing between both countries.
Finally, in column (3) we use the direct measure of immigration costs pro-
posed by Grogger and Hanson (2011), and include the same controls as in
column (2). Again, the results show a clear positive relationship between mi-
gration costs and student performance.5 Table A1 in the appendix shows that
our findings are qualitatively similar when we use the scores in Mathematics
and Language separately, when we exclude countries with a similar level of
development than Spain,6 and when we control for the quality of the school
system at origin.
4 Conclusion
We document a positive association between immigration costs and immigrant
children’s school performance. This result is relevant to understand achieve-
ment gaps between immigration groups, which is a key issue of public pol-
icy debates about integration of immigrants and persistent income inequality
5Estimations of migratory fixed costs are not available for some relevant source countries
as Morocco and Argentina, which have been excluded in this specification.
6These are the OECD members as of December 31st, 1989.
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across different ethnic or nationality groups. Our main finding is also useful to
design targeted support for learning of immigrant children. Importantly, the
fact we uncover in this note highlights once more how essential is to understand
the relevance of parental involvement in the learning process.
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A Robustness checks
Table A1 report the results of estimating similar specifications to those dis-
played in column (2) of table 2. Columns (1) and (2) in table A1 disaggregates
total scores by Mathematics and Language. Results are qualitatively similar
to what we obtain for the aggregate score. Columns (3) and (4) replicate
results in columns (2) and (3) of table 2, but excluding those countries with
similar level of development than Spain. Clearly, our results hold after this
re-sampling. Finally, results in columns (5) and (6) control for performance
in PIRLS and PISA assessment respectively. In both cases, the signs of our
variables of interest remain unchanged, but we lose power in the estimations.
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Table A1: Dependent Variable: Standardized Scores in the CDI exam.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Math Language Total Total Total Total
CommonLanguagek -0.373*** -0.192*** -0.377*** -0.259** -0.147*
(0.040) (0.047) (0.045) (0.124) (0.076)
ln(Distance)k 0.172*** 0.059** 0.152*** 0.132** 0.012
(0.019) (0.023) (0.022) (0.060) (0.039)
Immigrant Sharek -0.369*** -0.194 -0.238* -0.070 -0.458
(0.131) (0.152) (0.141) (0.672) (0.621)
MigratoryCostsHGk 0.004***
(0.001)
Socioeconomic controls (xi) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Characteristics of origin (zi) ln(GDP) ln(GDP) ln(GDP) ln(GDP) PIRLS PISA
School FE (γs) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 10,143 10,242 9,120 7,552 4,062 4,612
R-squared 0.378 0.371 0.403 0.404 0.510 0.477
Results in columns (3) and (4) exclude countries with similar development level than Spain.
Robust standard errors clustered by school and country of origin of the father in parenthesis.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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